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I. INTRODUCTION 
Over 169 million Americans use the Internet,1 with about 92 mil-
lion Americans going online during a typical day.2  Of these, over 42 
million send e-mail, over 9 million send an instant message, and 
nearly 1 million create a weblog.3  E-mail, instant messaging, and we-
blogs are merely a few of the many ways in which individuals commu-
nicate over the Internet.4  As use of the Internet as a means to com-
municate continues to grow, the lack of a comprehensive statute 
protecting the privacy of Internet communications exposes an ever-
increasing number of individuals to online privacy threats. 
To protect the privacy of their Internet activity, “individuals have 
historically relied on common law privacy principles and various 
pieces of non-comprehensive privacy-related legislation.”5  One stat-
ute frequently cited by those seeking to protect the privacy of their 
 ∗ J.D., 2007, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.S., 2001, The Pennsylvania 
State University. 
 1 See Pew Internet & American Life Project, Demographics of Internet Users, 
http://www.pewinternet.org/trends.asp (follow “Who’s Online” hyperlink) (last vis-
ited May 16, 2007) (containing statistics detailing that seventy percent of people over 
age eighteen use the Internet); U.S. Census Bureau, Annual Estimates of the Popula-
tion by Sex and Five-Year Age Groups for the United States: April 1, 2000 to July 1, 
2005, http://www.census.gov/popest/national/asrh/NC-EST2005/NC-EST2005-01. 
xls (presenting population estimates in five-year age groups). 
 2 Pew Internet & American Life Project, Daily Internet Activities, 
http://www.pewinternet.org/trends.asp (follow “Daily Activities” hyperlink) (last vis-
ited May 16, 2007). 
 3 Id. 
 4 See, e.g., Sharon Housley, E-mail, Instant Messaging, Blogs, RSS, Forums and 
Listservs: What's Next?, Oct. 7, 2004, http://www.webpronews.com/topnews/2004/ 
10/07/ email-instant-messaging-blogs-rss-forums-and-listservs-whats-next. 
 5 Yonatan Lupu, The Wiretap Act and Web Monitoring: A Breakthrough for Privacy 
Rights?, 9 VA. J.L. & TECH. 3, ¶ 5 (2004), http://www.vjolt.net/vol9/issue1/v9i1_a03-
Lupu.pdf. 
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Internet communications is the Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 
1968 (“Wiretap Act,” or “the Act”).6  Amended by the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA),7  section 2511 of the 
Wiretap Act provides a private right of action “against certain inter-
ceptions of electronic communications.”8  These statutes, however, 
were written prior to public adoption of Internet communication, 
and their language fails to adequately address concerns regarding the 
privacy of Internet communications.9
As new technologies emerge, new laws must be drafted to spe-
cifically address the technology.10  Unfortunately, the speed at which 
legislation can be enacted cannot match that at which new technolo-
gies are introduced.  As new means of Internet communication are 
introduced, the lack of a statute written specifically to protect the pri-
vacy of these communications results in uncertainty about exactly 
what privacy protections these communications will be afforded.11  
Furthermore, recent court rulings suggest that current law is inade-
quate to protect the privacy of Internet communications.12
This Comment examines cases that addressed the level of privacy 
protections given to Internet communications, focusing on a recent 
case from the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit that 
examined whether an Internet Service Provider (ISP) could intercept 
its subscribers’ e-mail messages without their knowledge or consent.13  
Although the court concluded that such an act was a violation of the 
Wiretap Act,14 this Comment suggests that the decision will have little 
impact in protecting the privacy of Internet communications, in part 
because of amendments to the Wiretap Act made by the Uniting and 
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
 6 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2000). 
 7 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 
1848 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
 8 Lupu, supra note 5, ¶ 5. 
 9 See id. n.9; see also Deirdre K. Mulligan, Reasonable Expectations in Electronic Com-
munications: A Critical Perspective on the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 72 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1557, 1558 (2004) (noting that in 1986, when the ECPA was enacted, 
“relatively few people had Internet access; commercial electronic mail services . . . 
were emerging, but . . . primarily served the business community.”). 
 10 See generally Jay Campbell, Protecting the Future: A Strategy for Creating Laws Not 
Constrained by Technological Obsolescence, 7 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 533, 539–40 (2005) 
(suggesting that current wiretapping laws are ill-suited to protect the privacy of 
Internet communications). 
 11 See id. at 541. 
 12 See infra Parts II.B.2–3. 
 13 United States v. Councilman (Councilman II), 418 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2005) (en 
banc). 
 14 Id. at 79. 
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Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act).15  
Part II will introduce the Wiretap Act and relevant amendments that 
resulted from the ECPA.  Part II will also discuss earlier attempts by 
individuals to use the Wiretap Act to protect the privacy of their 
Internet communications.  Part III will discuss United States v. Coun-
cilman,16 briefly recounting the case’s history, and focusing on the 
court’s en banc decision.  Part IV discusses the practical effects the 
decision is likely to have in protecting the privacy of Internet com-
munications, ultimately concluding that the decision will have no 
substantial impact on Internet communication privacy.  Finally, Part 
V suggests ways in which Internet communication privacy could be 
increased. 
In United States v. Councilman, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the First Circuit recently considered whether the Wiretap Act’s 
protections applied to e-mails stored on an ISP’s server.17  A panel of 
the court, in Councilman I, initially construed the Wiretap Act so nar-
rowly that it afforded practically no protection at all to e-mail and 
other Internet communications.18  The panel decision prompted out-
cry and criticism from privacy advocates who saw the decision as evis-
cerating what little privacy protections existed for Internet communi-
cations.19  At rehearing en banc, the court, in Councilman II, reversed 
the earlier panel decision, and held that e-mails in transient storage 
were indeed protected under the Wiretap Act.20
The en banc decision “restore[d] the law to what most had as-
sumed it meant: unauthorized access to e-mail before it arrives in the 
customer’s in-box is an interception covered by the Wiretap Act.”21  
However, this restoration may not be permanent. 
 15 See infra notes 103–07 and accompanying text. 
 16 418 F.3d 67 (Councilman II)(1st Cir. 2005) (en banc).  The earlier panel deci-
sion in United States v. Councilman, 373 F.3d 197 (1st Cir. 2004), will be referred to as 
Councilman I, and the later en banc decision as Councilman II. 
 17 Id. at 69–71. 
 18 United States v. Councilman (Councilman I), 373 F.3d 197 (1st Cir. 2004), rev’d 
en banc, 418 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2005). 
 19 See, e.g., 150 CONG. REC. S7893–96 (daily ed. July 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. 
Leahy).  Senator Leahy commented that “[i]f allowed to stand . . . [the panel deci-
sion] threaten[ed] to eviscerate Congress’s careful efforts to ensure that privacy is 
protected in the modern information age.”  Id. at S7893. 
 20 Councilman II, 418 F.3d at 69, 73. 
 21 Center for Democracy & Technology, Federal Appeals Court Reaffirms E-Mail Pri-
vacy Protections, Policy Post 11.20 (Aug. 17, 2005), available at http://www.cdt.org/ 
publications/policyposts/2005/20 [hereinafter Center for Democracy & Technol-
ogy]. 
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II. THE WIRETAP ACT 
A. History of the Wiretap Act 
Enacted by Congress in 1968, the Wiretap Act was largely a codi-
fication of the Supreme Court’s holdings in Berger v. New York22 and 
Katz v. United States.23  The Wiretap Act was intended to “encourag[e] 
the uninhibited exchange of ideas and information among private 
parties.”24  Among other things, the Wiretap Act makes it illegal to in-
tercept or conspire to intercept “any wire, oral, or electronic com-
munication.”25
As electronic communication technology advanced, the Wiretap 
Act was unable to adequately address these technological improve-
ments.26  Congress amended the Wiretap Act in 1986 to cover “the 
latest in electronic communication technology” by enacting the 
ECPA.27  The ECPA is divided into two parts: the Wiretap Act28 and 
the Stored Communications Act.29  The ECPA “generally extend[ed] 
the prohibitions on interception to e-mail and craft[ed] new protec-
tions for stored communications and stored records held by third 
parties.”30
Despite its best intentions, Congress could not anticipate ad-
vances in Internet communications when the ECPA was enacted.31  
“The words ‘Internet,’ ‘World Wide Web,’ and ‘e-commerce’ appear 
in neither the ECPA nor its legislative history.”32  Additionally, the 
ECPA “seemed particularly focused on the threat posed by police sur-
veillance and [was] intended to . . . specify permissible uses of new 
technology by law enforcement.”33  Modern Internet communication 
 22 388 U.S. 41, 51–53 (1967) (explaining that Fourth Amendment protections 
applied to electronic interception of oral communications). 
 23 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967) (holding that Fourth Amendment protections ap-
plied to telephone conversations). 
 24 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 532–53 (2001) (quoting Brief of Petitioner-
Appellant, United States, at 27). 
 25 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (2000). 
 26 See Mulligan, supra note 9, at 1561–64. 
 27 Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986).
 28 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2000). 
 29 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2000 & Supp. II 2003). 
 30 Mulligan, supra note 9, at 1564. 
 31 See Lupu, supra note 5, ¶ 9. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id.  Lupu notes that: 
[t]he Senate report begins with Justice Brandeis’ famous quote from 
Olmstead v. United States . . . : “Ways may some day be developed by 
which the Government, without removing papers from secret drawers, 
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has made the laws protecting the privacy of communication obsolete 
once again, and  
[d]espite continuous calls for a definitive legislative stance on the 
protection of [Internet communication], Congress has not en-
acted a comprehensive statute.  As a result, [individuals who claim 
their Internet communications have been illegally intercepted] 
have often relied on broad privacy-related statutes such as the 
Wiretap Act and the ECPA.34
The term “electronic communication” is broadly defined in the 
ECPA as “any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, 
or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, 
radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system that 
affects interstate or foreign commerce.”35  Although the definition 
would seem to include nearly all forms of Internet communication, 
courts have found that the technical nature of these communications 
often precludes the extension of Wiretap Act protections to the 
Internet.36
B. Use of the Wiretap Act to Protect Internet Communication Privacy 
Since the enactment of the ECPA and its consequential amend-
ment to the Wiretap Act, relatively few courts have interpreted the 
statute’s definition of “intercept.”  The ECPA has been described as 
“fraught with trip wires,”37 and “famous (if not infamous) for its lack 
of clarity.”38  The definitions adopted by courts having had an oppor-
tunity to interpret this term suggest that these characterizations are 
accurate. 
1. Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Service39
More than a decade ago, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit considered whether e-mails in electronic storage 
can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be enabled to expose 
to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the home. . . . Can it be that 
the Constitution affords no protection against such invasions of indi-
vidual security?” 
Id. at ¶ 9  n.22 (citing S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 2 (1986) (citing Olmstead v. United 
States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928))). 
 34 Id. ¶ 7. 
 35 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2000). 
 36 See infra Part II.B. 
 37 Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1543 (5th Cir. 1994). 
 38 Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 462 (5th Cir. 1994). 
 39 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994). 
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could be intercepted within the meaning of the Wiretap Act.40  In 
Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Service, the court considered 
whether the seizure of a computer, used to operate an electronic 
bulletin board system, and containing private electronic mail 
which had been sent to (stored on) the bulletin board, but not 
read (retrieved) by the intended recipients, constitute[d] an 
unlawful intercept under the Federal Wiretap Act as amended by 
[the ECPA].41
In concluding that the Wiretap Act had not been violated, the court 
focused on the distinction between the definitions of “wire commu-
nication” and “electronic communication” as set forth in the Act.42
Steve Jackson Games, Inc., published books, magazines, games, 
and related products.43  The company also operated an electronic 
bulletin board service (BBS), where it “post[ed] information about its 
business, games, [and] publications.”44  The BBS also allowed cus-
tomers “to send and receive private e-mail.”45  Until customers read 
their mail, it was temporarily stored on the hard drive of the BBS.46
During the course of an investigation into the unauthorized dis-
tribution of a text file containing information on Bell South’s emer-
gency call system, the Secret Service seized a computer used to oper-
ate the BBS.47  Secret Service employees later read and deleted 
unread e-mails stored on the BBS.48  However, the court found that 
the e-mails were not protected electronic communications and the 
Secret Service, therefore, did not violate the Wiretap Act by reading 
and deleting them.49  The court stated: 
The E-mail in issue was in “electronic storage”.  Congress’ use of 
the word “transfer” in the definition of “electronic communica-
tion”, and its omission in that definition of the phrase “any elec-
tronic storage of such communication” (part of the definition of 
“wire communication”) reflects that Congress did not intend for 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. at 458 (internal citations omitted). 
 42 Id. at 461–62. 
 43 Id. at 458 (citation omitted). 
 44 Id. 
 45 Steve Jackson Games, Inc., 36 F.3d at 458. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv., 816 F. Supp. 432, 435 (W.D. Tex 
1993). 
 48 Steve Jackson Games, Inc., 36 F.3d at 459. 
 49 Id. at 461–62. 
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“intercept” to apply to “electronic communications” when those 
communications are in “electronic storage”.50
This early decision made clear that certain forms of Internet com-
munication might not be protected under the Wiretap Act. 
2. Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines51
In Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit considered whether an employer’s unauthor-
ized viewing of an employee’s private, password-protected website was 
an “interception” in violation of the Wiretap Act.52  The court 
adopted a narrow definition of “intercept,” and held that, because it 
was in electronic storage, the website was not “intercepted” and there 
was no violation of the Wiretap Act.53
Konop, a pilot for Hawaiian Airlines, operated a website on 
which he “posted bulletins critical of his employer . . . and the in-
cumbent union.”54  By requiring visitors to the site to create a user 
name and password, Konop controlled access to the site and created 
a list of individuals eligible to access the site.55  A member of his em-
ployer’s management team, a class explicitly prohibited from viewing 
the site by the site’s terms and conditions, accessed the site by using 
the user names and passwords of two authorized users (with their 
permission).56  The court held that “for a website . . . to be ‘inter-
cepted’ in violation of the Wiretap Act, it must be acquired during 
transmission, not while it is in electronic storage.”57  Finding Konop’s 
website to be a stored electronic communication, the court con-
cluded that the unauthorized access was not a violation of the Wire-
tap Act.58  The court’s reasoning suggests that current law is ill-suited 
to meaningfully protect the privacy of Internet communications. 
3. United States v. Steiger59
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has 
also adopted a narrow interpretation of the Wiretap Act based on the 
 50 Id. 
 51 302 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 52 Id. at 872–74. 
 53 Id. at 878. 
 54 Id. at 872. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. at 873. 
 57 Konop, 302 F.3d at 878. 
 58 Id. 
 59 318 F.3d 1039 (11th Cir. 2003). 
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reasoning of the Fifth and Ninth Circuits.  In United States v. Steiger, 
the court noted that “very few seizures of electronic communications 
from computers will constitute ‘interceptions.’”60  The court quoted a 
scholarly work whose author identified a single circumstance when e-
mail may be intercepted: 
There is only a narrow window during which an E-mail intercep-
tion may occur—the seconds or mili-seconds [sic] before which a 
newly composed message is saved to any temporary location fol-
lowing a send command. Therefore, unless some type of auto-
matic routing software is used (for example, a duplicate of all of 
an employee’s messages are automatically sent to the employee’s 
boss), interception of E-mail within the prohibition of [the Wire-
tap Act] is virtually impossible.61
Whether under even these circumstances the Wiretap Act would be 
found to protect e-mail communications is an issue strikingly similar 
to the facts presented in a recent First Circuit case.62
III.     UNITED STATES V. COUNCILMAN 
In United States v. Councilman,63 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the First Circuit considered whether the Wiretap Act ap-
plied to e-mail communications in temporary storage on the server of 
an e-mail service provider.64  Bradford Councilman was a vice presi-
dent of Interloc, an online literary clearinghouse that provided lists 
of rare and out-of-print books.65  Interloc provided its customers with 
an e-mail address and was also the service provider.66  The indictment 
alleged that Councilman instructed Interloc employees to write a 
computer program that would intercept all incoming e-mails to Inter-
loc customers from Amazon.com and forward a copy to a mailbox 
 60 Id. at 1050. 
 61 Id. (quoting Jarrod J. White, Commentary, E-mail@Work.com: Employer Monitor-
ing of Employee E-mail, 48 ALA. L. REV. 1079, 1083 (1997)) (second brackets in origi-
nal). 
 62 Although the technological issues in United States v. Councilman are similar to 
those in Steve Jackson Games, Inc., Konop, and Steiger, it should be noted that the con-
duct complained of in the latter three cases was carried out using employers’ re-
sources and fell within the scope of the employment relationship, thereby potentially 
exposing the employers to liability.  This likely influenced the courts’ reasoning in 
those cases. 
 63 United States v. Councilman (Councilman II), 418 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2005) (en 
banc). 
 64 Id. at 67.  The Wiretap Act was amended in relevant respects in 2001, whereas 
Councilman’s alleged conduct occurred in 1998.  Therefore, all cites to statutes in 
the court’s opinion are to those in effect in 1998. 
 65 Id. at 70. 
 66 Id. 
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that Councilman could access.67  Councilman routinely read these e-
mails to gain a commercial advantage.68
Councilman contended that his conduct did not violate the 
Wiretap Act and moved to dismiss the indictment.69  Because the e-
mails were in “electronic storage”70 when copied, Councilman ar-
gued, they could not be “intercepted” as a matter of law.71  Initially, 
the district court denied Councilman’s motion to dismiss,72 but re-
considered its decision in light of Konop, which at that time had been 
recently decided.73  The district court found that, at the moment they 
were copied, the e-mails were in “electronic storage” and therefore 
not subject to the Wiretap Act’s prohibition on interception.  The 
court agreed with Councilman’s position and accordingly dismissed 
one count of the two-count indictment.74
On appeal, a divided panel of the court of appeals affirmed, 
concluding “that, because the definition of ‘wire communication’ in-
cludes ‘electronic storage’ but the definition of ‘electronic communi-
cation’ does not, the Wiretap Act’s prohibition on ‘intercept[ion]’ 
does not apply to messages that are, even briefly, in ‘electronic stor-
age.’”75  In his dissent Judge Lipez warned that the “line that we draw 
in this case will have far-reaching effects on personal privacy and se-
curity.”76  The full court later granted the government’s petition for 
rehearing en banc.77
At the en banc rehearing, the Councilman II court stated that 
Councilman’s argument raised questions of statutory construction78 
and began its analysis by introducing the history and scope of the 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Councilman II, 418 F.3d at 71. 
 70 “Electronic storage” is defined as “(A) any temporary, intermediate storage of 
a wire or electronic communication incidental to the electronic transmission thereof; 
and (B) any storage of such communication by an electronic communication service 
for purposes of backup protection of such communication.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17) 
(1994). 
 71 Councilman II, 418 F.3d at 71. 
 72 United States v. Councilman, 245 F. Supp. 2d 319, 320 (D. Mass. 2003). 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. at 321. 
 75 Councilman II, 418 F.3d at 71 (citing United States v. Councilman (Councilman 
I), 373 F.3d 197, 200–04 (1st Cir. 2004)). 
 76 Councilman I, 373 F.3d at 208 (Lipez, J., dissenting). 
 77 United States v. Councilman, 385 F.3d 793 (1st Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (grant-
ing rehearing en banc, withdrawing the panel opinion, and vacating the judgment).  
As discussed infra, the full court of appeals later reversed the panel decision. 
 78 Councilman II, 418 F.3d at 69. 
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Wiretap Act.79  The court then proceeded to address the arguments 
by discussing the Wiretap Act’s text, structure, and legislative his-
tory.80
First addressing the term “electronic communication,” the court 
initially noted that the term’s statutory definition appeared broad 
enough to include e-mail messages processed by a mail transfer agent 
(MTA).81  The Act defines “electronic communication” as “any trans-
fer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of 
any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electro-
magnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system that affects com-
merce, but does not include – (A) any wire or oral communication.”82  
Councilman argued that, when read together with the Act’s defini-
tion of “wire communication,” the scope of the definition of “elec-
tronic communication” would be limited by what the former includes 
but the latter does not.83  The Act defined “wire communication” as: 
any aural transfer made in whole or in part through the use of fa-
cilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of wire, 
cable, or other like connection between the point of origin and 
the point of reception . . . furnished or operated by any person 
engaged in providing or operating such facilities for the transmis-
sion of interstate or foreign communications or communications 
affecting interstate or foreign commerce and such term includes any 
electronic storage of such communication.84
Because the definition of “wire communication” included the phrase 
“and such term includes any electronic storage of such communica-
tion,” while the definition of “electronic communication” did not, 
Councilman argued that “Congress intended wire communications, 
but not electronic communications, to include electronic storage.”85  
The court also noted that the Act’s definition of “electronic storage” 
included “any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic 
communication incidental to the electronic transmission thereof.”86
Councilman based his inference on a canon of construction—
expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the express mention of one thing 
excludes all others)—and suggested that “where Congress includes 
particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another 
 79 Id. at 72. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. at 73. 
 82 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12)(A) (1994). 
 83 Councilman II, 418 F.3d at 73. 
 84 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (1994) (emphasis added). 
 85 Councilman II, 418 F.3d at 73. 
 86 Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17) (1994)). 
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section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts 
intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”87  
Addressing whether Councilman’s inference was justified, the court 
presented circumstances in which use of the canon is appropriate.88  
Because the sections’ “language, structure, or circumstances of en-
actment”89 differed, the court determined that the canon’s applica-
tion did not resolve the issue of whether electronic communications 
included electronic storage.90
Turning to the Act’s legislative history, the court discussed the 
changes to the Wiretap Act that resulted from the passage of the 
ECPA.91  At issue was the ECPA’s amendment of the definition of 
“wire communication,” to which the language “and such term in-
cludes any electronic storage of such communication” was added.92  
Based on the ECPA’s legislative history, the court concluded that the 
electronic storage clause was added to the definition of “wire com-
munication” for the sole purpose of regulating access to voice mail, 
not to remove electronic communications in temporary storage from 
the purview of the Wiretap Act.93
The court of appeals concluded that neither the text of the 
Wiretap Act nor its legislative history supported Councilman’s argu-
ment that there was a distinction between e-mails “in transit” and “in 
storage.”94  But while the Councilman II court’s opinion extends the 
protections of the Wiretap Act to e-mail messages prior to their arri-
val on the computer of the e-mail service provider, its limited scope 
 87 Councilman II, 418 F.3d at 73 (quoting the Supreme Court’s explanation of the 
canon in Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)). 
 88 Id. at 74–75.  The court stated that the expressio unius maxim is “most apt when 
Congress enacts a new, self-contained statute, and two provisions of that act, drafted 
with parallel language, differ in that one provision uses a term, but the other provi-
sion, where it would be equally sensible to use that term if Congress desired it to ap-
ply, conspicuously omits it.”  Id. at 74. 
 89 Id. at 74. 
 90 Id. at 76. 
 91 Id. at 76–77.  The ECPA was first introduced in 1985.  After the Department of 
Justice expressed concern that e-mail would be given too much protection under the 
original ECPA, a new version that met some of the concerns was introduced the fol-
lowing year.  Councilman II, 418 F.3d at 77. 
 92 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (1982), with 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (Supp. IV 1986) 
(The 1986 amendments to the definition of “wire communication” added the elec-
tronic storage clause, “and such term includes any electronic storage of such com-
munication.”).   
 93 Councilman II, 418 F.3d at 78–79. 
 94 Id. at 79. 
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does little to resolve larger privacy questions concerning Internet 
communications.95
IV.     COUNCILMAN’S EFFECT ON THE PRIVACY OF INTERNET 
COMMUNICATIONS 
Essentially, the First Circuit’s en banc decision does little more 
than “restore[] the law to what most had assumed it meant: unau-
thorized access to e-mail before it arrives in the customer’s in-box is 
an interception covered by the Wiretap Act.”96  Moreover, this per-
ceived restoration may not be long-lived. 
A. Spyware, Spam, and E-mail as a “Stored Communication” 
All major webmail services automatically scan incoming e-mail 
messages for viruses and spam.  The overwhelming majority of web-
mail subscribers likely understand the need for this practice, and this 
Comment does not suggest that the practice be discontinued.  How-
ever, without an exception in the Wiretap Act for such a practice, 
Councilman II would seem to make this practice illegal.  Recognizing 
the need for these scans, the Wiretap Act contains an exception for 
providers of electronic communication services.  Section 
2511(2)(a)(i) allows “provider[s] of wire or electronic communica-
tion service . . . to intercept . . . [wire or electronic] communica-
tion[s] . . . [when necessary] . . . to the rendition of . . . service or to 
the protection of the rights or property of the provider of that ser-
vice.”97  Scanning e-mails for viruses and spam undoubtedly falls un-
der this exception. 
However, the Councilman II decision does nothing to close the 
loophole in the Stored Communications Act that allows ISPs to read 
and use e-mails after they have reached the recipient’s inbox.  After 
an e-mail is delivered to a subscriber’s inbox, it ceases to be an “elec-
tronic communication” protected by the Wiretap Act, and instead be-
comes a “stored electronic communication” afforded the lesser pro-
tections of the Stored Communications Act.98  The provider of an e-
mail service may, without restriction, read and use, but not disclose, 
the contents of any stored e-mail.99  Whether an e-mail ceases to be an 
electronic communication “in transit” at a point earlier than when ac-
 95 See, e.g., Center for Democracy & Technology, supra note 21. 
 96 Id. 
 97 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i) (2000). 
 98 See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legis-
lator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1222–23 (2004). 
 99 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2702 (2000). 
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tually read by its intended recipient is an issue that the courts have 
yet to address. 
Most major ISPs expressly disavow reading their subscribers’ e-
mails.100  Nevertheless, “the gap in the law should be closed to reflect 
the norm.”101  As was suggested by the Center for Democracy and 
Technology, “ISPs should only be allowed to read and use their cus-
tomers’ e-mail when necessary to protect the ISPs’ rights or enforce 
the terms or service, or with prior informed consent, which is the rule 
that has always been applicable to voice communications.”102
Additionally, the USA PATRIOT Act103 might have a substantial 
impact on the effect of Councilman II.  Section 209 of the act 
amended the definition of wire communication by removing the lan-
guage “and such term includes any electronic storage of such com-
munication.”104  Although this amendment was intended to remove 
voice mail from the protection of the Wiretap Act, it also weakens 
perhaps the most logical argument in support of extending Wiretap 
Act protections to e-mail in transit.  Specifically, if voice mail were af-
forded the protections of the Wiretap Act, it would be illogical to 
treat e-mail in transit disparately. 
Although courts have not yet specifically addressed section 209’s 
effect on the interception of e-mail messages in transit, the Konop 
opinion is helpful in evaluating the amendment’s potential conse-
quences.  In Konop, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit noted that “[b]y eliminating storage from the definition of 
wire communication, Congress essentially reinstated the pre-ECPA 
definition of ‘intercept’—acquisition contemporaneous with trans-
mission—with respect to wire communications.”105  Furthermore, the 
court suggested that when the USA PATRIOT Act was passed, “Con-
 100 See, e.g., Gmail Terms of Use, http://gmail.google.com/gmail/help/terms_of_ 
use.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2007) (Section 8 states that “[n]o human will read the 
content of your e-mail . . . without your consent”); see also Saul Hansell, You’ve Got 
Mail (and Court Says Others Can Read It), N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2004, at C1. 
 101 Center for Democracy & Technology, supra note 21. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required 
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 
(2001) (codified as amended in scattered titles and sections of 8, 15, 18, 22, 31, 42, 
49, and 50 U.S.C.). 
 104 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (2000) (defining the term wire communication to 
include “electronic storage of such communication”), with 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) 
(Supp. I 2001) (defining the term wire communication, from which the clause “and 
such term includes any electronic storage of such communication” has been de-
leted). 
 105 Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, 302 F.3d 868, 878 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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gress . . . was aware of the narrow definition courts had given the 
term ‘intercept’ with respect to electronic communications”106 and by 
choosing not to modify that definition, “Congress . . . accepted and 
implicitly approved the judicial definition of ‘intercept’ as acquisition 
contemporaneous with transmission.”107  If correct, this reasoning 
suggests that an ISP may intercept e-mail messages en route from 
sender to recipient, while those messages are in transient storage, 
without a violation of the Wiretap Act. 
B. Gmail 
Shortly after Google’s April 1, 2004, announcement of its release 
of Gmail, the service was criticized by privacy groups as breaching 
wiretapping laws and exposing users to increased threats to privacy.108  
Two aspects of Gmail are of particular concern, but on only one 
might Councilman II have a significant impact.109  Specifically, 
Google’s use of Adsense technology, which scans messages in order to 
deliver targeted advertisements and related information, may, after 
Councilman II, be an “interception” in violation of the Wiretap Act.110
Gmail uses Adsense, the same program that places text adver-
tisements on Google search result pages, to scan e-mails upon viewing 
and deliver targeted advertisements based on the content of the e-
mail.111  This advertising subsidizes the cost of the service, and many 
users are willing to accept this practice in return for free service.112  
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. 
 108 See, e.g., Hansell, supra note 100, at C1; Press Release, Thirty-one Privacy and 
Civil Liberties Organizations Urge Google to Suspend Gmail (Apr. 19, 2004), avail-
able at http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/GmailLetter.htm (urging suspension of 
Gmail service until privacy issues are adequately addressed). 
 109 The second aspect of concern is Gmail’s 2.5-gigabyte storage capacity, which 
allows the average subscriber to store e-mails indefinitely, as storage space is no 
longer an issue.  Thorough discussion of this concern, however, is beyond the scope 
of this Comment, as it has little to do with the Councilman II decision and existed be-
fore Gmail’s introduction.  For an analysis and discussion of the concerns associated 
with Gmail’s storage capacity, see Brad Templeton, Privacy Subtleties of GMail, 
http://www.templetons.com/brad/gmail.html (last visited May 18, 2007). 
 110 See About Gmail, http://gmail.google.com/gmail/help/about_privacy.html 
(last visited May 18, 2007). 
 111 See About Gmail: Are There Ads in Gmail?, http://mail.google.com/mail/ 
help/about.html (last visited May 18, 2007); What’s Adsense, http://www.google 
.com/services/adsense_tour/index.html  (last visited May 18, 2007). 
 112 Google has declined to report exactly how many subscribers Gmail currently 
has, revealing “only that there [are] millions.”  Laurie J. Flynn, Google Links Chat and 
Mail Services, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 8, 2006, at 16. 
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However, after Councilman II, this practice may be in violation of the 
Wiretap Act. 
As discussed above, scanning e-mail for spam is undoubtedly a 
“necessary incident to the rendition of . . . [e-mail] service,”113 and 
service providers may properly intercept e-mail messages for those 
purposes.  Additionally, there are few technical differences between 
scanning for spam and scanning to deliver targeted advertisements.114  
But courts have yet to decide whether scanning to deliver targeted 
advertisements can be considered a “necessary incident to the rendi-
tion of . . . [e-mail] service.”115
While subscribers to Gmail consent to have their e-mails scanned 
as part of the service’s terms of use, those who send e-mail to Gmail 
accounts have not done so, and those e-mails are being scanned as 
well.116  It is this scanning of e-mail from non-consenting persons that 
is of particular concern. 
Whether Wiretap Act protections apply to e-mails from non-
consenting correspondents will likely depend, in part, on when an e-
mail ceases to be an electronic communication “in transit,” and in-
stead becomes a “stored electronic communication.”117  “Clearly, an 
opened . . . e-mail is no longer covered by the Wiretap Act.”118  But 
whether the act of logging onto an e-mail service provider’s website 
without reading new e-mails is enough to move these communica-
tions out from under Wiretap Act protections is an issue yet to be de-
cided.  The earlier e-mails are no longer considered to be “in transit” 
and are instead considered “stored electronic communications,” the 
fewer privacy protections they will be afforded. 
 113 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i) (2000). 
 114 See, e.g., Electronic Privacy Information Council, Gmail Privacy Page, http:// 
www.epic.org/privacy/gmail/faq.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2005) (Section 2.4 states 
that “[f]rom a technical standpoint, there is no categorical difference between 
Google ‘content extraction’ and spam filtering – each involves an automated process 
that analyzes the body and/or header information of e-mail messages.”). 
 115 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i). 
 116 See Gmail Terms of Use, http://mail.google.com/mail/help/terms_ 
of_use.html (last visited May 18, 2007); see also Gmail Privacy Policy, http://gmail. 
google.com/mail/help/privacy.html (last visited May 18, 2007) (describing Google’s 
practice of “maintain[ing] and process[ing] your Gmail account and its contents to 
provide . . . relevant advertising”).  A subscriber’s Gmail account contents could cer-
tainly include e-mails from non-Gmail accounts.  Id. 
 117 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (prohibiting interception of electronic communi-
cations in transit), with 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (prohibiting unauthorized access to wire 
and electronic communications in electronic storage), and United States v. Council-
man, 418 F.3d 67, 80–81 (1st Cir. 2005) (noting that stored electronic communica-
tions are not protected by the Wiretap Act). 
 118 Center for Democracy & Technology, supra note 21. 
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If unopened e-mails are considered “stored electronic commu-
nications” when a subscriber logs onto a service provider’s website, 
then Google’s use of Adsense will probably not violate any Wiretap 
Act prohibitions.119  If, however, e-mails must be opened (i.e., read) 
to become “stored electronic communications,” it may be argued that 
Gmail scans are an interception in violation of the Wiretap Act. 
Again, it should be noted that individuals sending e-mail from 
their Gmail account have consented to having their e-mails 
scanned.120  But replies to these e-mails, and e-mails sent from non-
Gmail accounts, are composed by individuals who have not consented 
to having their e-mails scanned.121  Moreover, a non-Gmail user may 
not be aware that his addressee is using Gmail; many Gmail subscrib-
ers forward e-mails from other accounts to their Gmail account.122
Some commentators suggest that Gmail has been unfairly tar-
geted by privacy advocates and legislators.123  However fair or unfair 
this criticism, Gmail offers numerous benefits that have not been 
matched by its competitors, and Gmail subscribers number in the 
millions.124  Whether or not Gmail intercepts electronic communica-
tions in violation of the Wiretap Act will depend in part on the rea-
soning adopted by courts considering the question.  Courts adopting 
the First Circuit interpretation of the Wiretap Act are more likely to 
find that scanning e-mail from non-consenting users with the purpose 
of delivering targeted advertising is a prohibited interception under 
the Act, while courts adopting the narrow Fifth Circuit definition of 
“intercept” would likely not find such a violation.125
 119 Assuming unopened e-mails are indeed “stored electronic communications,” 
one author has suggested that the Stored Communications Act be amended to allow 
interception of e-mail by the service provider only when doing so does not monetar-
ily benefit the service provider.  Jason Isaac Miller, “Don’t Be Evil”: Gmail’s Relevant 
Text Advertisements Violate Google’s Own Motto and Your E-mail Privacy Rights, 33 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1607, 1640 (2005). 
 120 See id. 
 121 See id. 
 122 See, e.g., id. at 1609 (noting that “[e]-mail forwarding has become a widely used 
practice due to the number of individuals who maintain multiple e-mail accounts”). 
 123 See, e.g., Grant Yang, Stop the Abuse of Gmail!, 2005 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 14, 34–
36 (2005) (suggesting that Gmail’s practices are consistent with those of its competi-
tors and with industry standards). 
 124 See Flynn, supra note 112, at 16. 
 125 See supra Parts II.B and III. 
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C. Voice over Internet Protocol 
A related privacy issue is emerging with consumer use of Voice 
over Internet Protocol (VoIP) set to grow rapidly.126  Essentially, VoIP 
enables individuals to use the Internet to make telephone calls.127  Al-
though a decade old,128 adoption of VoIP had been hampered be-
cause it requires broadband Internet to operate properly.129  With the 
increasing adoption by consumers of broadband Internet access, 
which includes cable modems and digital subscriber lines, use of 
VoIP is expected to grow rapidly.130  According to a recent survey re-
leased by Nielsen/NetRatings, broadband use by Americans in-
creased sixteen percent from January 2005 to August 2005, and the 
number of Americans with broadband access is now over 120 million, 
or forty-two percent of the U.S. population.131  Furthermore, this 
trend is likely to continue as providers lower the cost for broad-
band.132  In the United States, cable VoIP subscribers grew from 
911,000 in March 2005 to 1.38 million by the end of June 2005, and 
analysts predict that there will be approximately four million VoIP 
subscribers by the end of 2005.133  That number is expected to in-
crease to over seventeen million in the next few years.134  In addition 
to lower cost as compared with traditional phone service, use of VoIP 
carries with it the possibility of attaching documents, video, and other 
data to a phone call.135
Traditional telephone systems connect calls using a system 
known as circuit switching.136  When a call is made, this method main-
 126 See Jon Van, VoIP Moves Beyond Blip Stage; Site Reviews Providers, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 
6, 2006, at 6. 
 127 See id. 
 128 Intertangent Technology Directory, History of VoIP, http://www.intertangent 
.com/023346/Articles_and_News/1413.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2005). 
 129 See Paul Taylor, Mark Odell & Michiyo Nakamoto, Why VoIP Telephony Is Quickly 
Coming of Age, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2005, available at www.westlaw.com, 2005 WLNR 
14151006. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Press Release, Nielsen/NetRatings, Two Out of Every Five Americans Have 
Broadband Access at Home (Sept. 28, 2005), available at http://www.netratings.com/ 
pr/pr_050928.pdf. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Taylor, supra note 129. 
 134 Id. 
 135 See, e.g., Owen D. Kurtin & Arthur S. Katz, Has Internet-Based Phone Calling Out-
paced the Law?: A Hands-Off Regulatory Approach Fostered VoIP, but Its Competitors Are 
Highly Regulated. What Should Be Done?, 27 LEGAL TIMES 45 (describing as “revolution-
ary” the possibilities associated with VoIP). 
 136 VoIP: Circuit Switching and Packet Switching, http://computer.howstuffworks 
.com/ip-telephony2.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2007). 
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tains a connection, known as a circuit, between the parties for as long 
as they both remain on the line.137  While dependable, this method is 
inefficient because much of the data transmitted during a telephone 
call is wasted.138  In contrast, VoIP technology utilizes a more efficient 
method to transmit data, known as packet switching.139  While circuit 
switching maintains a constant connection, packet switching opens a 
connection just long enough to send a small amount of data, known 
as a packet, from one computer to another.140  The data transmission 
is similar to that of e-mails, with individual data packets sent along the 
least congested route before being reassembled at their destina-
tion.141
However, the same technological aspects of VoIP that make it ef-
ficient also raise significant concerns about the privacy of these com-
munications, an issue that neither the courts nor Congress have yet 
addressed.  Although a complete discussion of the legal issues related 
to VoIP is beyond the scope of this Comment, one important privacy-
related issue is worth noting. 
It would appear that VoIP communications could reasonably be 
classified as either a “wire communication,” like a traditional tele-
phone call, or as an “electronic communication” under the Wiretap 
Act.142  The technical aspects of VoIP make the transmission seem 
similar in many respects to the transmission of e-mail and other “elec-
tronic communication[s].”143  Furthermore, the Act’s definition of 
“electronic communication” includes “any transfer of . . . sounds.”144  
However, it seems more likely that courts will, at least initially, classify 
VoIP communications as “wire communications” for two reasons.  
First, despite its technical aspects, a VoIP communication remains an 
“aural transfer,” and remains, in essence, a telephone call.145  Second, 
the House report concerning the ECPA made Congress’s intentions 
clear when it stated that “[a]s a rule, a communication is an elec-
tronic communication if it . . . [cannot] fairly be characterized as one 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. 
 142 See supra notes 82–84 and accompanying text. 
 143 Compare VoIP: Circuit Switching and Packet Switching, supra note 136 (explain-
ing the difference between traditional telephone systems and the VoIP system), with 
18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2000) (defining “electronic communication”). 
 144 § 2510(12). 
 145 See § 2510(1). 
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containing the human voice.”146  Thus, it seems that the most logical 
classification for VoIP would be as a “wire communication,” providing 
the same level of privacy protections that traditional telephone calls 
enjoy.   
Assuming that courts do find VoIP to be a “wire communica-
tion,” the USA PATRIOT Act’s amendment to the definition of “wire 
communication” again becomes troubling.147  The amendment sup-
ports the argument that while VoIP communications in transit are 
covered by the Wiretap Act, VoIP communications in storage, includ-
ing the transient storage associated with the transfer of these com-
munications, are afforded only the less robust protections of the 
Stored Communications Act. 
V. STRATEGIES TO IMPROVE THE PRIVACY OF INTERNET 
COMMUNICATION 
Existing law is ill-suited to protect many forms of Internet-based 
communication.  Written at a time when recent technological ad-
vances and widespread use of the Internet as a means to communi-
cate could not have been foreseen,148 portions of the Wiretap Act are 
now obsolete and inadequate to protect the privacy of Internet com-
munication.  As the district court in the Councilman decision ob-
served, “technology has, to some extent, overtaken language.  Travel-
ing the Internet, electronic communications are often—and perhaps 
constantly—both ‘in transit’ and ‘in storage’ simultaneously, a lin-
guistic but not a technological paradox.”149  The distinction between 
communications “in transit” and communications “in storage” is no 
longer relevant.  This distinction could be eliminated by either legis-
lative or judicial action.  As this Part will suggest, the best way to en-
sure the privacy of Internet communications is to enact specific legis-
lation. 
Before proceeding, a short introduction to a currently available 
judicial—and legislative—independent solution is appropriate.  In 
the absence of a comprehensive statute, individuals can be proactive 
in protecting their Internet communications by adopting encryption 
technologies.  One popular program that can be used to encrypt e-
mail messages is Pretty Good Privacy (PGP).150  PGP uses “public key 
 146 Councilman II, 418 F.3d at 77 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 35 (1986)). 
 147 See supra notes 103–07 and accompanying text. 
 148 See supra Part II.A. 
 149 United States v. Councilman, 245 F. Supp. 2d 319, 321 (D. Mass. 2003). 
 150 PGP software can be downloaded as freeware for noncommercial use from 
www.pgpi.com. 
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cryptography” to generate two keys: a public key to encrypt data, and 
a private key for decryption.151  The public key, as its name suggests, 
may be distributed to anyone with whom an individual corresponds, 
while the private key is kept secret.152  Individuals can then use the 
public key to encrypt e-mails that only a recipient with the private key 
can read.153  Encryption software is also available for instant messag-
ing, and the creator of PGP recently created a prototype to be used 
with VoIP.154
While it is a somewhat cumbersome solution, a good encryption 
program is effective against all but the most determined attackers.155  
Additionally, even the most comprehensive statute can only establish 
what conduct is permissible in regard to third party access to Internet 
communication; it cannot itself prevent impermissible conduct.  Fur-
thermore, as a result of the rapidity with which communication tech-
nology is presently advancing, any governing statutes will likely be re-
active rather than proactive.156  Encryption is a solution that protects 
communication privacy against unscrupulous conduct, whether or 
not an existing statute prohibits that conduct. 
As noted, however, encryption technologies can be cumbersome 
and confusing, and this drawback has prevented their widespread 
adoption.157  The creator of PGP has himself described the program 
as “not that easy to use”158 and noted that “[w]e’ll be better off if we 
develop a system that your mom can use.”159  Regardless of whether 
such a system is ever developed, Congress and the courts should work 
to protect the privacy of Internet communications. 
A. Judicial Solution 
Both narrow and broad judicial solutions that would protect 
Internet communications have been proposed.160  The narrow solu-
 151 PGP Corporation, An Introduction to Cryptography 12 (June 8, 2004) (on file with 
author). 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. 
 154 See Kim Zetter, Privacy Guru Locks Down VoIP, WIRED NEWS, July 26, 2005, 
http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,1282,68306,00.html. 
 155 See Michael Cohn, 7 Myths About Network Security: The Only Way to Keep Data Safe 
May Be to Stay One Step Ahead of Hackers, INS. & TECH., June 1, 2005, at 41. 
 156 See generally Campbell, supra note 10. 
 157 See Michael Bazeley, Building a Useful Wall: Internet Users Can Reclaim Some Pri-
vacy from the Unscrupulous, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, May 4, 2003, at 6D. 
 158 Id. 
 159 Id. 
 160 See Campbell, supra note 10, at 542–47. 
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tion consists of “looking to congressional intent to fill in gaps in the 
wiretapping laws,”161 so that Internet communications are given an 
appropriate level of protection.  However, numerous circuit courts 
have rejected this approach, making it “unlikely that [this] approach 
would be uniformly adopted.”162
The broad judicial solution would protect communications gen-
erally, including Internet communications, and would be based on 
existing Constitutional and tort concepts—the Fourth Amendment 
and the tort of invasion of privacy.163  In his dissent in Olmstead v. 
United States,164 Justice Brandeis stated: 
The makers of our Constitution . . . sought to protect Americans 
in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensa-
tions.  They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be 
let alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most 
valued by civilized men.  To protect that right, every unjustifiable 
intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the individual, 
whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the 
Fourth Amendment.165
Additionally, “[c]ourts have already found liability for wiretap-
ping under the ‘unreasonable intrusion’ rubric of invasion of pri-
vacy.”166 By drawing on the “unreasonable intrusion” ground and Jus-
tice Brandeis’s language, it is suggested that “[i]t would be only a 
small step to add Internet-based communications to the protected 
class of communications.”167
B. Legislative Solution 
In the United States, no comprehensive law protects privacy 
rights.168  Instead, “[p]rivacy rights arise from a patchwork of constitu-
tional rights, common law rights, and federal, state, and local laws.”169  
 161 Id. at 542–43. 
 162 Id. at 543.  Campbell notes that the “First, Third, Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh 
Circuit Courts of Appeal have found areas in which the current wiretapping laws do 
not protect communications.”  Id. at 538.  Additionally, Campbell suggests that per-
haps the best scenario would be that a circuit split develops, which the Supreme 
Court may resolve “in favor of using congressional intent to fill in the wiretapping 
law’s gaps.”  Id. at 543. 
 163 Id. 
 164 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
 165 Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 166 Campbell, supra note 10, at 544. 
 167 Id. 
 168 Suzanne Ross McDowell, Nonprofits and the Internet: Tax and Other Legal Issues, 
21 No. 10 COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW. 21, 34 (2004). 
 169 Id. 
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A 1998 Federal Trade Commission Report to Congress described 
“American privacy law . . . as sectoral, consisting of a handful of dis-
parate statutes directed at specific industries.”170  Some of these stat-
utes are specific to Internet privacy, but many are not.171  There are 
two specific steps that Congress could take to remedy this shortcom-
ing in the law. 
First, Congress should eliminate the current storage-transit di-
chotomy that exists in relation to the transmission of Internet com-
munications.  Internet communications should be afforded the same 
level of protection regardless of whether they are in transit or in the 
type of transient storage associated with the store-and-forward 
method of Internet communications.  Furthermore, Congress should 
amend the Wiretap Act’s definition of “electronic storage” to elimi-
nate any possibility that the definition could be interpreted as apply-
ing to electronic communications in the type of transient storage in-
cidental to store-and-forward transmission. 
In reaction to the panel decision in Councilman I, Vermont’s 
Senator Leahy and New Hampshire’s Senator Sununu introduced the 
E-Mail Privacy Act of 2005.172  This legislation would amend the defi-
nition of “intercept” in the Wiretap Act to read: “‘intercept’ means 
the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, 
or oral communication contemporaneous with transit, or on an on-
going basis during transit, through the use of any electronic, me-
chanical, or other device or process, notwithstanding that the com-
munication may simultaneously be in electronic storage.”173  This 
proposal is essentially a codification of the holding in Councilman II 
and would eliminate both the dichotomous treatment of intercep-
tions of wire and electronic communications and the distinction be-
tween electronic communications in transit and those in transient 
storage. 
 170 MARTHA K. LANDESBERG ET AL., PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 62 n.160 
(1998).  The report also lists a number of federal statutes governing privacy rights in 
specific industries.  Id.  See also Richard D. Marks, Security, Privacy, and Free Expression 
in the New World of Broadband Networks, 32 HOUS. L. REV. 501, 503 (1995) (noting that 
current federal statutes governing privacy form a “haphazard” pattern) (quoting 
Darryl C. Wilson, Viewing Computer Crime: Where Does the Systems Error Really Exist?, 11 
COMPUTER/L.J. 265, 265 (1991)). 
 171 See LANDESBERG ET AL., supra note 170, at n.160. 
 172 S. 936, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 173 Id. at § 2.  As currently written, the Wiretap Act defines “intercept” as “the au-
ral or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communica-
tion through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device.”  18 U.S.C. § 
2510(4) (2000). 
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The Wiretap Act currently defines “electronic storage” as “(A) 
any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic commu-
nication incidental to the electronic transmission thereof; and (B) 
any storage of such communication by an electronic communication 
service for purposes of backup protection of such communication.”174  
The problem with this definition is that, as shown by Councilman II, it 
can be interpreted to create an overlap between the Wiretap Act and 
the Stored Communications Act.175  That is, a violation of the Wiretap 
Act can sometimes occur when a stored electronic communication is 
intercepted.176  And although the court’s reasoning is true to the 
Wiretap Act’s purpose, one can credibly argue that it is technically 
incorrect.177
The “temporary, intermediate storage” in the definition of “elec-
tronic storage” was intended to describe back-up storage, or storage 
that occurs when an electronic communication is undeliverable, not 
storage that occurs while a communication is en route from sender to 
recipient.178  However, Internet communications do indeed undergo 
“temporary, intermediate storage” during transmission, and the 
Councilman I court relied heavily on this phenomenon in concluding 
that there could be no violation of the Wiretap Act because the e-
mails were taken from electronic storage.179
The definition of “electronic storage” should be changed to 
complement the Leahy-Sununu amendment and to reflect the idea 
that Internet communications in transit are at no time during trans-
mission in “electronic storage” for purposes of the Wiretap Act.  
Drawing on language currently employed, a potential amendment 
could read: 
(1) “electronic storage” means – 
(A) any storage of a wire or electronic communication sub-
sequent to the electronic transmission thereof; and 
(B) any storage of such communication by an electronic 
communication service for purposes of backup protection of 
such communication; but does not include 
 174 § 2510(17). 
 175 See Councilman II, 418 F.3d at 80–82. 
 176 See id. 
 177 See id. at 85–88 (Torruella, J., dissenting).  In his dissent, joined by Senior Cir-
cuit Judge Cyr, Judge Torruella argued that a strict construction of the term “elec-
tronic storage” necessitated a conclusion that Councilman could not have violated 
the Wiretap Act.  Id. (Torruella, J., dissenting). 
 178 See, e.g., Mulligan, supra note 9, at 1568–69. 
 179 United States v. Councilman (Councilman I), 373 F.3d 197, 202–04 (1st Cir. 
2004). 
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(C) transient, momentary storage incidental to electronic 
communication transmissions employing electronic com-
munications systems.180
The above amendment to the definition of “electronic storage,” 
combined with enactment of the E-Mail Privacy Act of 2005, will 
hopefully ensure Internet communications’ inclusion within the pro-
tections of the Wiretap Act when the communications are en route 
from sender to recipient. 
VI.     CONCLUSION 
Despite the potential privacy threats associated with their use, 
Internet communication technologies will continue to be employed 
by an ever-increasing number of individuals.  Attracted by the techno-
logical efficiency, convenience, and potential for cost savings, the ma-
jority of people who communicate using the Internet likely do so 
without much thought for the privacy of their communications.  As is 
true with many of the rights we enjoy, most people do not seem to be 
concerned about their right to privacy until it has been violated.181
The decision in Councilman II was undoubtedly a step in the di-
rection toward protecting the privacy of Internet communications.  It 
was, however, a small step.  Limited to its rather unusual and techni-
cal facts, the court’s decision is unlikely to have a substantial impact 
on Internet communication privacy.  Until other courts adopt the 
reasoning of Councilman II, any effect the decision does have will be 
felt in only a few states in New England. 
Unfortunately, there seems to be no panacea to guard against 
Internet communication privacy threats.182  While individuals should 
be proactive in protecting the privacy of their online communications 
by adopting simple encryption technologies to ensure that communi-
cations they wish to be private are so, legislation is the best way to en-
sure the privacy of Internet communications.  Hopefully, Congress 
will soon see fit to enact legislation that not only ensures that cur-
rently existing rights remain intact, but also will undo the effects of 
what many feel have been unduly narrow interpretations of laws cited 
by those seeking to protect their privacy. 
 
 180 “Electronic communications system” is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(14) (2000). 
 181 See, e.g., ROBERT O’HARROW, JR., NO PLACE TO HIDE 74–83 (2005). 
 182 See supra notes 168–71 and accompanying text. 
